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Introduction

18
In his classical contribution Cournot (1838, Chapter In Section 3 we consider free entry with a fixed cost. all -PWL (Proposition 2).
96
In Section 4 we consider heterogeneous firms. We close to one whereas H is close to zero (Proposition 3).
103
This shows that H is not a reliable measure of WL. 2 This form of demand generalizes both linear (α = 1) and isoelastic (with elasticity of demand 1 / α) forms and allows for computation of equilibria. 3 The parameter α, which can be estimated but not observed, enters in the formula of PWL in Anderson and Renault (2003) , so it is unavoidable in the more general set ups considered in this paper. 4 Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) offer an example of a market where PWL is arbitrarily close to one but in which the inverse demand function is not differentiable. 5 Other attempts to find higher WL focus on issues outside market competition like "X-Inefficiency", Leibenstein (1966) and RentSeeking, Tullock (1967). 6 That social welfare is increasing in the marginal cost of small firms was first pointed out by Lahiri and Ono (1988) . For a criticism of the idea that concentration is generally bad for social welfare see Daughety (1990 
The Baseline Model
135
There is a representative consumer with a utility 
142
There are n identical firms each producing a single
Marginal cost is constant and denoted by c. Profits for condition holds and that equilibrium is symmetric. Thus
153
Cournot equilibrium output and market price are Social welfare in equilibrium and in the optimal 163 allocation, are, respectively properties of L(·,·) are easily proved: 
PWL is
PWLu W o À W ⁎ W o ¼ 1À n 1 a n þ a þ 1 ð Þ n þ a ð171 i) lim n → ∞ L(α,n) = 0. 172 ii) lim α → − 1 L(α,n) = 0. 173 iii) lim n → ∞ L(α,n) = 0. 174 iv) L(α,·) decreases with n. 175 v) L(·,n)is quasi-concave in α.
193
We now study PWL as a function of α. that if firms are in the market, firm n has non-negative 214 profits but firm (n + 1) has non-positive profits, formally
Welfare in a Cournot equilibrium with free entry is (α, n), occurs for the maximum value of k, namely
ð3:5Þ Minimal PWL, denoted by MI(α, n), occurs for the 241 minimum value of k, namely
ð3:6Þ 242
244
We now state the properties of and MA(·,·) and
245
MI(·,·) that correspond to i)-iv) in the previous section. for this -apparently paradoxical -result is that k changes 268 in order to maintain the free entry condition (3.1).
269
We now show that, if k and α are unknown, PWL is MAâ ; n ð Þ¼v. Now set
This system can be solved easily because the first Wâ ; n ð ÞN0.
318
Plugging the values of Â and b into Eq. (2.1) we
From the first inequality in Eq. (3.1) (with equality) 323 and the definition of k it follows that 
The intuition of the latter equation is that large values 
The right hand side can be interpreted as the rate of 
365
Finally when α = 1, BE reads, 
378
This system can be solved, as we showed before. below). Cournot equilibrium is easily shown to be unique and given by
aþ1 . In equilibrium, (a 1 , a 2 , …a n ) yields a unique market structure compatible with Cournot equilibrium and that given a market structure 420 we can construct a vector (a 1 , a 2 , … ,a n ) (in fact an infinity number of vectors) whose Cournot equilibrium yields this 421 market structure. Given this, we will focus on market structure that has the advantage of being observable.
422
Plugging the last part of Eq. (4.4) into Eq. (4.2) and after lengthy calculations we obtain PWL as a function of and 423 the market structure, namely ii") lim aYl P s 1 ; H; a ð Þ¼
iii") P(·, H, α) is increasing on s 1 .
440
iv") P (s 1 , ·, α) is decreasing on H. i") is identical to i). When firms are identical ii") reduces to ii). Point iii') agrees with the received wisdom: the larger the 444 dominant firm, the closer to monopoly, and hence the larger the PWL is. However, iv") is counterintuitive because it says 445 the larger the concentration, the lower the WL. The reason is that when H increases, production is shifted to the less 446 efficient firms which causes social welfare to fall. Finally v") allows us to extend P(s 1 , H,·) to α = 0 preserving continuity.
447
We now discuss why the approach followed in the previous section will not work here. An Observation is a list observation is 2n + 1 and the number of parameters defining a market is n + 3. With n N 2, the number of parameters will 452 be, in general, unable to generate the required observations. Also, first order conditions of profit maximization imply that
453
455
This relation may fail even for the case n = 2. Given this, we will study how PWL depends on α, n and the market 456 structure focussing our attention on limiting cases, i.e. when PWL is maximal or minimal. Our first result is that when 10 In fact, s 1 and H are not independent but we prefer to write Eq. (4.5) in this way to highlight the role of H in the formula. 11 As we mentioned before, we take s 1 and H as independent when in fact they are not.
α, n, and the market structure can be chosen simultaneously, PWL can be arbitrarily close to one and at the same time 458 the concentration index H arbitrarily low.
460
Proposition 3. There exists (α, n, s 1 , …, s n ) for which PWL is arbitrarily close to one and H is arbitrarily close to zero.
461
Proof. From iv") the maximal PWL occurs when s 2 = s 3 = ,…, = s n . Denoting these shares by y, we have that s 1 + (n − 1) 462 y = 1. Plugging this in Eq. (4.5) we have that PWL is increasing on n so the maximum PWL obtains when n is arbitrarily large, i.e. We easily compute lim α → ∞ lim n → ∞ P(s 1 , n, α) = lim n → ∞ lim α → ∞ P(s 1 , n, α) = 1 − s 1 . Thus when α and n are very 469 large and s 1 very small, PWL is arbitrarily close to one (since limits are interchangeable our procedure is robust).
470
The restriction s 1 ≥ s i , i = 2, …, n when firms 2, …, n are identical, is equivalent to ns 1 ≥ 1. This inequality
471
holds when the order of magnitude at which n tends to ∞ is larger than the order of magnitude at which s 1 tends 472 to 0.
473
Finally, it can be easily shown that when firms 2 to n are identical,
which when n → ∞ and s 1 → 0 tend to zero. □
476
From the previous proof it follows that for n and α large, PWLg1 À ffiffiffiffi H p which highlights the point made before 477 about the relationship between concentration and WL.
478
It can be shown that if one of the variables in our construction is held fixed, can be made large, but not close to one,
479
and is again far from being a reliable measure of Corchón (2006) , pp. 19-21. We now perform a more demanding 480 exercise where PWL is studied by varying only one variable, either the market structure or α.
481
We first concentrate on how market shares affect PWL. A market structure such that s 1 N s 2 = ,…, = s n N 0 will be 482 called a Dominant Firm. A limit case of a dominant firm is Monopoly where only s 1 is positive. for all j N 1. Since (n − 1)s j ≤ s 1 the previous inequality can be written as 1 n V s 1 V1. Now, rewrite Eq. (4.6) as follows:
ð4:8Þ . We easily compute,
From these expressions we obtain the desired result.
501
If α N 1 from the first order condition we obtain two solutions, Clearly only the solution with a plus sign in front of the square root is feasible. We will show that for this solution sign AP 1 n ; n; a
which is positive because the expression on the right hand side is increasing in α and for α = − 1 equals to zero. Also 511 from Eq. (4.8) we obtain that sign AP 1; n;
which is negative so the interior solution is indeed a maximum.
514
Finally let us consider the case α b 1. Suppose that the negative root in Eq. (4.10) is less than one. Then switches from positive to negative means that P(·, n, α) is increasing, so it achieves the maximum when s 1 = 1. □
521
Proposition 4 says that the most deleterious market structure is not always monopoly, the target of the 522 wrath of economists since Adam Smith. In many cases a dominant firm structure is worse because firms other than 523 do not add much competition to the market and they are technologically inefficient. We notice that under maximal 524 PWL,
so H decreases with n but PWL increases with n. And H increases with s 1 but PWL not necessarily so. Thus, again, the 527 concentration index H is a poor measure of WL.
528
The maximum PWL for given n and α is obtained by plugging the value of s 1 that maximizes PWL as found in
529
Proposition 4 and denoted by s(α, n), into P(s 1 , n, α). Let P(s(α, n), n, α) ≡ F(α, n), say.
of, at least, F(α, 2) which for values of α ∈ (0, 50] never goes below. Finally, we state two limiting properties of F(·,·):
Notice that in both cases PWL is high even for small values of α and n. It is clear that lim n → ∞ , α → ∞ F(α, n) = 535 lim α → ∞ , n → ∞ F(α, n) = 1.
536
We now turn to the study of the market structure that minimizes PWL. Lemma 1 implies that only three market structures might minimize PWL: 1) All firms produce the same output 2)
543
All firms minus one, say n, produce the same output. Proposition 5. The market structure that minimizes PWL is when all firms produce the same output.
549
Proof. Notice that market structures 1 and 2 can be written as (x, x, …, 1− (n − 1)x) with xa 
Now, computing APW a;x;n ð Þ Ax this expression is found to be equal to 
So only boundary solutions are feasible and PWL is minimized when
Suppose that α N 1. Clearly, the negative root is not feasible, so consider the positive root, say x ⁎ . If x T V 1 n , it must be 563 that (n − 1) (α 2 + αn − 1 − n) ≤ 0 which for n N 2 and α N 1 is impossible.
564
Suppose that α b 1. If the negative root is less than or equal to 1 n , we have that À is achieved at the boundaries of x. Since in this case these bounds imply monopoly and duopoly, by iv) in Section 2 we 569 achieve the desired result. □
570
An implication of Proposition 5 is that disregarding firms heterogeneity stacks the deck in favour of small WL.
571
Also, minimal PWL is given by the function L(·,·) in Eq. (2.4). Recall that maximal PWL is given by the function 572 F(α,·) (defined in the second paragraph after the end of Proposition 4). Notice that since L(α,·) is decreasing 573 in α and F(α,·) is increasing in n, the difference between maximal and minimal PWL increases with n for a given 574 α. Also, since P(·, n, α) is continuous in s 1 , any PWL between L(α, n) and F(α, n) is reachable by the choice 575 of s 1 .
576
Finally we consider the effect of α alone on PWL. We have little to say about the value of α that maximizes 577 PWL because first order condition of maximization with respect to α is not very informative. However, the continuity 578 of P(s 1 , n, ·) has an interesting implication. Let V umax 
